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I. INTRODUCTION: AUNG SAN AND THE LEGACY OF FORGETTING 
In the dying days of the British Empire, after the Second World War, the 
Governor of Burma faced the problem of what to do about a young Burmese 
lieutenant called Aung San. Early in the war, Aung San led the Burma Inde-
pendence Army (BIA), fighting on the side of the Japanese Imperial Army to 
drive the British from Burma.1 When the tide of war turned against the Japa-
nese, Aung San joined the British forces, contributing to the success of the 
Allied military strategy in the Far East.2 After the war, as leader of the Anti-
Fascist People’s Freedom League, Aung San negotiated with the British to 
achieve Burmese independence.3 To the British, Aung San was a powerful 
political actor and the key to ensuring that Burma transitioned peacefully from 
British colony to loyal member of the Commonwealth.4 
Aung San was also, in likelihood, a war criminal. In 1942, he killed a local 
Muslim headman, Abdul Rashid, who had been appointed by the British to 
manage a village on the country’s southern coast.5 Rashid’s widow and sev-
eral eyewitnesses claimed that Aung San threw Rashid into a locked cart with 
a pig and starved him for eight days,6 before crucifying him to a goalpost in a 
public stadium and bayoneting him to death.7 Aung San did not deny that he 
had carried out the killing, but he claimed that it had taken place after a court 
 
 1 Nicholas Tarling, Lord Mountbatten and the Return of Civil Government to Burma, 
11 J. IMP. COMMONW. HIST. 197, 197–99 (1983). In 1988, the government changed the 
English-language name of the country from “Burma” to “Myanmar.” Throughout this Ar-
ticle, I use “Burma” when referring to events before 1988, and “Myanmar” for the post–
1988 period. This usage reflects accepted academic practice in Burmese Studies. See 
CATHERINE RENSHAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PARTICIPATORY POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
(2019). 
 2 See AUNG SAN SUU KYI, My Father, in FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND OTHER WRITINGS 
22 (Michael Aris ed., 1991) [hereinafter FREEDOM FROM FEAR]. 
 3 S. R. Ashton, Burma, Britain, and the Commonwealth, 1946–56, 29 J. IMP. 
COMMONW. HIST. 65, 68 (2001). 
 4 See Hugh Tinker, Burma’s Struggle for Independence: The Transfer of Power Thesis 
Re-Examined, 20 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 461, 462 (1986); J. S. Furnivall, Twilight in Burma: 
Reconquest and Crisis, 22 PAC. AFF. 3 (1949); Hugh Tinker, Burma: Power Transferred 
or Exacted? Reflections on the Constitutional Process, in BRITISH POLICY AND THE 
TRANSFER OF POWER IN ASIA: DOCUMENTARY PERSPECTIVES 24 (R.B. Smith & A.J. Stock-
well eds., 1987). 
 5 CHRISTOPHER BAYLY & TIM HARPER, FORGOTTEN WARS: THE END OF BRITAIN’S 
ASIAN EMPIRE 378 (2008). 
 6 Id. at 382. 
 7 The Humble Petition of Ma Ahma, Wife of the Late Abdul Raschid, Residing at 
Paung, No. 452 IOR: M/5/102 (Apr. 8, 1946), in HUGH TINKER ET AL., BURMA: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1944–1948: DOCUMENTS FROM OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 
SOURCES 728 (1983) [hereinafter BSI]. 
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martial that found Rashid guilty of pro-British activities, cruelty and corrup-
tion.8 On Aung San’s account, the context of the killing was the mass looting 
and murder which accompanied the BIA’s entry into southern Burma in 1942 
and that in any regard, “in such slave countries as Burma, it cannot be said 
that conformity with the law is justice.”9 Aung San declared that his con-
science was clear: “To confess the truth, however, though this measure is not 
at all regular, yet it was rough and ready justice to suit the time and the con-
ditions prevailing in the country.”10 
The prevailing conditions included violent reprisals by Aung San’s BIA 
against largely Christian ethnic groups who remained loyal to the British, such 
as the Chin, Kachin and Karen minorities.11 In September 1945, for example, 
a group of Karen leaders wrote to Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India 
and Burma, detailing what the Karen had suffered at the hands of the BIA: 
While Burma was under the military administration of the 
Burma Independent Army . . . they branded the Karens as re-
bels, and persecuted and tortured them in all possible ways and 
in certain districts resorted to wholesale massacre, not even 
leaving babies, and set the Karen villages on fire. In 
Myaungmya District alone, the Official Report reveals that 
about 400 villages were set on fire in this way, and more than 
1,800 Karens were slaughtered . . . Karens of the Salween Hill 
District, Papun, fared worse. All of the leading men were 
slaughtered, and their wives and daughters before being mas-
sacred were subjected to a moral degradation in the presence 
of their husbands and fathers . . . At that time no influential 
Burmese leader raised his hand and called a halt to such sense-
less massacre. Were it not for the timely intervention of the 
Nippon Imperial Armies, we could not imagine how far the 
matter would have gone.12 
The British vacillated on whether to prosecute Aung San. Originally, Ad-
miral Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander South East Asia Command, 
 
 8 Translation of Extract from Hanthawaddy Newspaper (Apr. 7, 1946), No. 451 IOR: 
M/5/112, in BSI, supra note 7, at 726; see also FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at 26. 
 9 Aung San’s rejoinder to the charges in the Legislative Council was printed in the Han-
thawaddy newspaper. Translation of Extract from Hanthawaddy Newspaper (Apr. 7, 
1946), No. 451 IOR: M/5/112, in BSI, supra note 7, at 726 c. (Apr. 4, 1946); see BAYLY & 
HARPER, supra note 5, at 381–84. 
 10 Translation of Extract from Hanthawaddy Newspaper (Apr. 7, 1946), No. 451 IOR: 
M/5/112, in BSI, supra note 7, at 726. 
 11 See PAUL H. KRATOSKA, The Karen of Burma Under Japanese Rule, in SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN MINORITIES IN THE WARTIME JAPANESE EMPIRE 27 (Paul H. Kratoska ed., 2002). 
 12 The Humble Memorial of the Karens of Burma to His Britannic Majesty’s Secretary 
of State for Burma, No. 286 IOR: M/4/3023 (Sept. 26, 1945), in BSI, supra note 7, at 494. 
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was entirely opposed to any general amnesty for the BIA: “They must be told 
that their present actions were appreciated but that their past offenses have not 
been forgotten.”13 Governor Dorian Smith regarded the prosecution of Aung 
San as a test of the government’s willingness to allow the law to take its 
course: “[n]ot to act was to impugn the law and bring it into contempt.”14 
Deputy Governor John Wise noted that others had been hanged for similar 
offenses and thought it “deplorable” that Aung San’s status would exempt 
him.15 By 1946, however, the views of the British had evolved. Mountbatten 
wrote: 
Aung San’s antics may be disturbing, but there is no doubt in 
my mind that he played the game by me . . . He is bound to be 
a leading figure for some years to come . . . . We would do 
better to concentrate on showing him and his friends the paths 
in which we think the true future of Burma lies.16 
Mountbatten advised the Governor that to arrest Aung San would be “the 
greatest disservice which could be done towards the future of Burma within 
the British Empire” and to bring Aung San to trial for what was essentially an 
act of wartime justice, when cooperation with Aung San’s forces was proving 
so effective, would be a “gross act of disloyalty.”17 Mountbatten noted that 
the murder of Rashid “appears to have occurred during the period immediately 
following our retreat; in the heat of the moment, and in the unsettled condi-
tions which must have existed, it was only to be expected, I suppose, that 
summary justice would rule, and that old scores would be paid off.”18 
Eventually, realpolitik prevailed. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Dorian 
Smith wrote of a “new approach” to Aung San. He suggested that rather than 
prosecute, the British should adopt a Burmese characteristic trait “to forgive 
and forget.”19 In 1946 the British parliament passed the War-Time Crimes 
(Exemption) Act 1946 (Burma Act No. XLVII of 1946).20 The Act did not 
 
 13 Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia SAC (Misc.) 5th Meet-
ing, 27 March, 1945, No. 107 PRO: WO 203/4404, in BSI, supra note 7, at 196. 
 14 Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith to Arthur Henderson, No. 464 IOR: M/5/102 (Apr. 26, 
1946), in BSI, supra note 7, at 743. 
 15 Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House, Rangoon, on 27 March 1946, No. 
435 IOR: M/5/102, in BSI, supra note 7, at 704. 
 16 Letter from Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia to Governor of Burma 
(Mar. 26, 1946), Document 431, in BSI, supra note 7, at 698. 
 17 William Crawley, Britain in Burma: The Last Act, 16 ASIAN AFF. 308, 310 (1985). 
 18 Lieutenant General G. W. Symes to Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, in BSI, supra note 
7, at 543. 
 19 Letter from Dorman-Smith to Clement Attlee (May 7, 1946), Document 490, in BSI, 
supra note 7, at 773. 
 20 Robert Cribb, Burma Trials of Japanese War Criminals 1946–1947, in WAR CRIMES 
TRIALS IN THE WAKE OF DECOLONIZATION AND COLD WAR IN ASIA, 1945–1956: JUSTICE IN 
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provide a pardon for Aung San and his soldiers for their treason or wartime 
atrocities, nor did it grant a general amnesty. It simply required the Governor’s 
consent before a court could accept a criminal case involving offenses com-
mitted in Burma from December 8, 1941 to May 5, 1945. After the war, the 
British held a relatively small number of war crimes trials in Burma to prose-
cute Japanese officers,21 but in delicate matters such as that of Aung San, cases 
were permitted to languish and fade away. With Burma’s independence, a line 
was drawn under the crimes of the Second World War. 
Aung San is Myanmar’s most important political symbol.22 To the Bur-
mese, he is the father of independence.23 Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of 
Aung San, describes her father as “the man who had come in their hour of 
need to restore their national pride and honour [sic]”24 and calls his memory 
“a reservoir of national strength and pride.”25 Aung San is revered not only 
for his heroism on the battlefield and for negotiating Burma’s exit from the 
British Empire, but also for uniting the country’s deeply divided and heavily 
armed ethnic armies at the end of the Second World War.26 The assassination 
of Aung San in 1947 is regarded as a national tragedy that deformed the shape 
 
TIME OF TURMOIL 130 (Kerstin von Lingen ed., 2016) (citing War-Time Crimes (Exemp-
tion) Act 1946 (Burma Act No. XLVII of 1946)). 
 21 Id. at 133–34 (“The first British war crimes trial in Rangoon, which opened in March 
1946, prosecuted 13 Japanese soldiers and their commander, Major Ichikawa Seigi, on 
charges of carrying out at massacre at Kalagon, a predominantly Muslim village near 
Moulmein. An estimated 600 villagers were killed on 7 July 1945 because some of them 
had collaborated with British special forces operating in the region behind Japanese 
lines.”). 
 22 Josef Silverstein, The Idea of Freedom in Burma and the Political Thought of Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi, 69 PAC. AFF. 211 (1996). 
 23 Matthew J. Walton, Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: The Myths of 
Panglong, 48 ASIAN SURV. 889 (2008); Tin Maung Maung Than, The Essential Tension: 
Democratization and the Unitary State in Myanmar (Burma), 12 SOUTH EAST ASIAN RES. 
187 (2004); LIAN H. SAKHONG, IN SEARCH OF CHIN IDENTITY: A STUDY IN RELIGION, 
POLITICS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY IN BURMA 208–210 (2003); FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra 
note 2, at 3–38. 
 24 FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at 37. 
 25 Aung San Suu Kyi, The True Meaning of BOH, 31 ASIAN SURV. 793 (1991); FREEDOM 
FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at 191. 
 26 At that conference, the country’s leaders agreed to shape their new democracy as a 
federal union that respected the rights of religious and ethnic minorities. Alan Smith, 
Burma/Myanmar: The Struggle for Democracy and Ethnic Rights, in MULTICULTURALISM 
IN ASIA 268 (Will Kymlicka & Baogang He eds., 2005); MARTIN SMITH, BURMA: 
INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 78–89 (1991); KYAW YIN, UNFORGETTABLE 
SPEECHES OF BOGYOKE AUNG SAN 115 (1969); see The Constitution of the Union of Burma, 
with amendments, in TIN MAUNG MAUNG, BURMA’S CONSTITUTION (1959); E Burke Inlow, 
The Constitution of Burma, 17 FAR EASTERN SURV. 257, 264–67 (1948); Benegal Narsing 
Rau, The Constitution of Burma, 23 J. WASH. L. REV. 288 (1948); David I. Steinberg, My-
anmar’s Perpetual Dilemma: Ethnicity in a “Discipline-Flourishing Democracy” (East 
West Ctr., Working Paper No. 22, 2011), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private 
/pswp022.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32834. 
430 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:425 
of Burmese history and led to half a century of civil war and authoritarian 
rule.27 In Yangon today, Aung San’s family home—where Aung San Suu Kyi 
spent some of her childhood—is preserved as a museum. The artifacts of 
Aung San’s life depict the young general as a simple, modest, thoughtful man, 
driven by a fierce desire for freedom. On the walls of the museum are descrip-
tions of Aung San’s bravery on the battlefield and his cunning as a statesman. 
There are no references to the brutality of events that led up to Burmese inde-
pendence. The murder of Rashid is not registered—it is an occlusion in the 
fabric of social memory. 
The killing of Abdul Rashid took place in circumstances of anarchy and 
the suspension of ordinary rule under the tide of conflict. At different periods 
in modern Burmese history these circumstances have reoccurred in northwest 
Myanmar.28 Freed from the constraints of civil law, the military has perpe-
trated atrocities against the country’s minority Muslim population, the Roh-
ingya.29 Bloodlands is the name given by one author to the ungoverned spaces 
in Poland which became sites for genocide during the Second World War.30 
The name is apposite for some of Myanmar’s outlier states, where the central 
civilian authority exercises incomplete power, where powerful ethnic armies 
vie for control of parts of the state, and where minority groups such as the 
Rohingya, without citizenship, suffer at the hands of both. The lesson of his-
tory, it seems, is that in places such as these things happen for which historical 
justice is not possible, and that afterwards, political  pragmatism and public 
forgetting is an appropriate response. 
 
 27 Aung San Suu Kyi dedicated her book Freedom from Fear and Other Writings to the 
memory of her father. FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at v (“When I honour my father, 
I honour all those who stand for political integrity in Burma.”). 
 28 Maung Zarni & Alice Cawley, The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya, 
23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 683 (2014). 
 29 In this Article, I focus on the Rohingya. However, as the UN International Fact Find-
ing Mission made clear in its report of September 2018, Myanmar’s military have also 
carried out crimes against humanity and war crimes against other ethnic and religious mi-
norities, such as the Kachin, Karen, and Shan peoples, in the period since the end of the 
Second World War. See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64 
(Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter IFFM 2018]; and UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UN 
Doc A/HRC/42/50 (Aug. 8, 2019) [hereinafter IFFM 2019]. 
 30 TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN 6 (2012). 
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Sceptics of transitional justice caution against extravagant claims about 
what can be achieved by trials or truth commissions in the aftermath of ad-
ministrative massacre.31 Sceptics argue that institutions and processes of tran-
sitional justice can impede political settlements necessary for peace32; that 
they do not produce reliable historical records about the context of interna-
tional crimes33; that they do not provide all victims with a voice, healing or 
closure34; that there is scant evidence they deter future leaders from commit-
ting other atrocities35; and that there is no convincing causal link between 
criminal trials in transitional contexts and the rule of law, democratic consol-
idation, or the advancement of liberal values.36 Sceptics would argue that the 
British were right to stay the hand of justice in the case of Aung San.  
The trial of Aung San for the murder of Rashid, had it taken place, would 
probably not have bought comfort to Rashid’s widow or dissuaded General 
Ne Win from violating the constitution and orchestrating a military coup four-
teen years later. The trial’s legitimacy, as a process established by Burma’s 
colonial rulers against one of the country’s war heroes, would almost certainly 
have been impugned. Public sentiment would have run with Aung San: the 
argument that his cause was just and that his actions were extenuated by the 
larger historical context would have been very well received by key sections 
of the public.37 
When juxtaposed with the pragmatic arguments of sceptics, the arguments 
marshalled by proponents for transitional justice can appear comparatively 
vague and difficult to support with empirical evidence. Professor Mark Osiel, 
for example, argues that criminal trials have utility because of their potential 
to uncover complex histories and explain the motivations of individuals in-
volved, and in the process of legal argument and counter-argument there is 
 
 31 Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 463, 468 (1995) (“Administrative massacre” is the phrase used by Mark Osiel 
to mean “large scale violation of basic human rights to life and liberty by the central state 
in a systematic and organized fashion, often agaimst its own citizens, generally in a climate 
of war – civil or international, real or imagined.”). 
 32 Nick Grono & Adam O’Brien, Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes, in 
COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 13–20 (Nicholas Waddell & 
Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
 33 Anna Bryson, Victims, Violence, and Voice: Transitional Justice, Oral History, and 
Dealing with the Past, 39 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 299 (2016). 
 34 Anna Macdonald, From the Ground Up: What Does the Evidence Tell Us About Local 
Experiences of Transitional Justice?, 1 TRANSITIONAL J. REV. 72 (2015). 
 35 Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International Criminal Trials and the 
Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 434 (2013). 
 36 Oskar N.T. Thoms, James Ron and Roland Paris, State-Level Effects of Transitional 
Justice: What Do We Know?, 4(3) INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL J. 1 (2010). 
 37 More than 500 people watched Rashid’s murder, yet the British could find only five 
witnesses—all Indians—who were prepared to give evidence against him. See Lieutenant 
General G. W. Symes to Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, in BSI, supra note 7, at 543. 
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potential for awakening or deepening the kind of inter-personal understanding 
that is fundamental to a tolerant society.38 Osiel argues that at the societal 
level, post-conflict trials are forums where debate concerning basic under-
standings about the relationship between the individual and the state can be 
rehearsed and reflected upon. In circumstances where “the need for a new 
beginning is widely felt, the very process of critical reassessment—to which 
the dramatic power of liberal show trials can contribute—may itself be sym-
bolically treated (and later commemorated) as a decisive moment of collective 
refounding.”39 Scholars like Osiel might argue that the trial of Aung San and 
the publicity, public debate, and historical record that it left, would have raised 
questions about the moral complexity of Aung San’s act, about political vio-
lence, about the virtues of civil tolerance; and about the equal moral worth of 
all individuals, including those who, like Rashid, were outsiders or “others” 
to society. These questions, simmering in political consciousness over a long 
period of time, might have contributed to creating a political culture that was 
more sensitive to the perspectives and experiences of minorities. 
In this article I examine Myanmar’s troubled transition towards a limited 
form of constitutional democracy in the period 2008–2018 as a case study of 
what can happen when “forgetting” is adopted as a political response to atroc-
ity. Before 2008, in the decades that followed independence from Britain, 
Burma experienced the collapse of democracy, single party rule, and military 
dictatorship. During the periods of military governance, the country’s people 
experienced the massive and grave violations of human rights that accompany 
rule by fiat. Compounding the suffering was ongoing civil war between the 
armed forces of the central government, the Tatmadaw, and ethnic minority 
armies in the borderlands. In relation to the country’s minority Muslim popu-
lation, the Rohingya, there was widespread public antipathy. The causes of 
animosity were various: historical enmity associated with the colonial period; 
religious prejudice against Muslims among the country’s deeply Buddhist ma-
jority; perceptions that Muslims contributed to economic scarcity. At the pub-
lic policy level, prejudice manifested in the 1982 Citizenship Law, which re-
stricted the right of Rohingya to claim citizenship;40 in public discourse which 
labelled the Rohingya as outsiders and “others;” and in periodic efforts to 
drive the Rohingya over the border to Bangladesh through military operations 
which aimed to clear Rohingya villages of insurgents. 
In 2008, the country began a transition from military rule toward a limited 
form of constitutional democracy.41 The transition was engineered by the mil-
 
 38 Osiel, supra note 31, at 493 (“Through this process,” writes Osiel, “dangerous mis-
conceptions about ‘the other’ can be overcome.”). 
 39 Id. at 481. 
 40 See 1982 Citizenship Law (Myan.). 
 41 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Setting the Rules for Survival: Why the Burmese Military Regime 
Survives in an Age of Democratization, 22 PAC. REV. 271 (2009); Ashley South, Political 
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itary itself and eventually supported by the country’s main democratic politi-
cal party, the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi.42 
Transition took place without national measures to deal with the legacy of 
massive human rights abuses—without criminal prosecutions, truth-telling, or 
reparations.43 There appeared to be sound practical reasons for this. The mil-
itary was in control of the transition: threatening it would destabilize the po-
litical situation and risk a coup d’état.44 In many parts of the country, civil war 
and accompanying violations of international humanitarian law and interna-
tional human rights law continued; amassing evidence of what happened in 
the past was problematic while conflict was ongoing.45 Myanmar’s legal sys-
tem was overburdened and its judges ill-equipped to deal with dispensing or-
dinary justice: the vast and complex caseload that would result from efforts to 
address historical justice was beyond its capacity.46 The country’s complex 
history was dark and tangled: Myanmar was not the first country to move to-
wards the future by drawing a line under the past.47 To a significant extent, 
the United Nations and key members of the international community, includ-
ing the United States and Great Britain, supported the pursuit of demi-democ-
ratization without accountability.48 In the early years of the transition, long-
 
Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization, 26(2) CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST 
ASIA 233, 234 (2004); Khin Zaw Win, 2010 and the Unfinished Task of Nation-Building, 
in RULING MYANMAR: FROM CYCLONE NARGIS TO NATIONAL ELECTIONS 19–31(Nick 
Cheesman et al. eds., 2010); Yash Ghai, The 2008 Myanmar Constitution: Analysis and 
Assessment, BURMA LIBRARY (2008); Nick Cheesman, Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of 
Law in Myanmar, 82 PAC. AFF. 597, 599 (2009). 
 42 Hlaing, supra note 41, at 288. 
 43 Ben Rhodes, What Happened to Aung San Suu Kyi?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2019), https 
://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/09/what-happened-to-aung-san-suu-kyi/5 
94781/. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Rhodes, supra note 43. 
 46 Cheesman, supra note 41. 
 47 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Transitional Justice Versus Traditional Justice: The Basque 
Case, 12 JEMIE 30, 33 (2013); Landon E. Hancock, The Northern Irish Peace Process: 
From Top to Bottom, 10 INT’L STUD. REV. 203 (2008); Amaia Alvarez Berastegi, Transi-
tional Justice in Settled Democracies: Northern Ireland and the Basque Country in Com-
parative Perspective, 10 CRITICAL STUD. ON TERRORISM 542 (2017); Patricia Lundy, Par-
adoxes and Challenges of Transitional Justice at the “Local” Level: Historical Enquiries 
in Northern Ireland, 6 CONTEMP. SOC. SCI. 89 (2011); Andrew Rigby, Amnesty and Amne-
sia in Spain, 12 PEACE REV. 73 (2000); Shane Alcobia-Murphy, Lest We Forget: Memory, 
Trauma, and Culture in Post-Agreement Northern Ireland, 39 CANADIAN J. IRISH STUD. 82 
(2016). 
 48 Jonathan T. Chow & Leif-Eric Easley, Myanmar’s Democratic Backsliding in the 
Struggle for National Identity and Independence, ASAN FORUM (June 25, 2019), http://ww 
w.theasanforum.org/myanmars-democratic-backsliding-in-the-struggle-for-national-ident 
ity-and-independence/. 
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standing sanctions against Myanmar were lifted,49 and the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar suspended 
calls for the establishment of a UN Commission of Inquiry into crimes against 
humanity carried out by the military.50 
Instead of establishing institutions to pursue historical justice, the archi-
tects of Myanmar’s transition sought to transform political culture, foster civic 
trust and signal an end to impunity and arbitrary rule by gradually strengthen-
ing the rule of law. The hope was that acts of contemporary justice would 
ground the belief that norms associated with democratic governance now 
played a meaningful role in guiding the behaviour of power-holders. The new 
government established institutions (a Human Rights Commission, a Rule of 
Law Committee, an Electoral Commission) and prosecuted some members of 
the military who carried out extra-judicial killings.51 In relation to the circum-
stances of the Rohingya, however, transition presaged little change.52 The 
1982 Citizenship Law was not amended, and in the general elections of 2015, 
the National League for Democracy did not field a single Muslim candidate.53 
In 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi’s long-time friend and legal adviser, the Muslim 
constitutional lawyer U Ko Ni, was assassinated.54 Suu Kyi did not attend his 
funeral nor, in the immediate aftermath of the incident, did she make any pub-
lic comment in relation to his murder.55 Finally, in 2016 and 2017, in response 
to attacks by a Muslim terrorist organization on several border guard posts in 
 
 49 Catherine Renshaw, Top-Down Transitions and the Politics of US Sanctions, in THE 
BUSINESS OF TRANSITION: LAW REFORM, DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMICS IN MYANMAR 228 
(2017). 
 50 Reports calling for the Commission of Inquiry include: UN Human Rights Council, 
Tomás Ojea Quintana (Special Rapportur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar), 
Progress Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 
¶122, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/48 (Mar. 10, 2010) (“United Nations institutions may consider 
the possibility to establish a commission of inquiry with a specific fact-finding mandate to 
address the question of international crimes”); UN Human Rights Council, Tomás Ojea 
Quintana (Special Rapportur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar), Rep. of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, ¶¶ 68–72, U.N. Doc. 
A/65/368 (Sept. 15, 2010). 
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J. ON HUM. RTS. & L. 1 (2012). 
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w.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar. 
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burma/burm005-02.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 54 Tom Lasseter, In a Muslim Lawyer’s Murder, Myanmar’s Shattered Dream, REUTERS 
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northwest Myanmar, the military orchestrated “clearance operations” that re-
sulted in extreme violence against the Rohingya.56 750,000 Rohingya fled 
across the border to Bangladesh.57 Across Myanmar, thousands of people 
marched in the streets in support of the military’s actions. 
In this article I explain why Myanmar’s political leaders eschewed recog-
nizing or accounting for the injustices of the past and I argue that this failure 
was one of the factors that made possible the genocide perpetrated on the 
country’s minority Muslim population, the Rohingya. I argue that after almost 
half a century of military rule, political consciousness within Myanmar re-
quired radical readjustment; a dramatic shift in the contours of understanding 
about the past and the appropriate relationship between the individual and the 
state. The prosecution of one of the country’s generals for well-documented58 
crimes against humanity might have achieved this, in the same way that the 
prosecution of Aung San might have achieved it during the country’s transi-
tion from colonial rule. A trial would not necessarily have created an author-
itative record of history from which lessons could be taken to build an imag-
ined democratic future. But what it might have achieved—and what is still 
urgently required—is the foundation for what Osiel describes as “the solidar-
ity embodied in the increasingly respectful way that citizens can come to 
acknowledge the differing views of their fellows.”59 What is required in My-
anmar is broad public debate about the morality of the military’s actions dur-
ing the years of dictatorship, wide-scale deliberative reflection about society’s 
existing political culture, and a period of deep national self-examination about 
the effects of long-term repression.60 
It is a relatively straightforward matter to point to concrete examples of 
cases where justice has been pursued in the wake of conflict and the result, for 
individuals and societies, has fallen well short of the promise. It is a more 
 
 56 Stephanie Nebehay, Brutal Myanmar Army Operation Aimed at Preventing Rohingya 
Return: U.N., REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohi 
ngya-un/brutal-myanmar-army-operation-aimed-at-preventing-rohingya-return-u-n-idUS 
KBN1CG10A. 
 57 Ishaan Tharoor, The Rohingya Crisis Can’t Stay Bangladesh’s Burden, Prime Minis-
ter Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/09/3 
0/rohingya-crisis-cant-stay-bangladeshs-problem-prime-minister-says/. 
 58 There are many reports into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 
Myanmar. The report published by the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law 
School is an example of the careful reporting and analysis on Burma/Myanmar that uni-
versities, NGOs and various bodies within the United Nations have carried out. See THE 
INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., CRIMES IN BURMA 8 (2009). 
 59 Osiel, supra note 31, at 478. 
 60 Instead, in the decade following the 2010 elections, the words “transitional justice” 
were taboo in Myanmar. A workshop I organized in 2016 in Kachin state with Professor 
Adam Czarnota, titled “Justice During Times of Transition” was shut down half-way 
through the first session on the orders of the Office of the State Prosecutor (Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s office). 
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uncertain and hazardous task to attempt to argue that the absence of justice 
measures resulted in a political culture that is intolerant, illiberal, and prone 
to political violence. It is doubly hazardous to make the attempt while events 
are still unfolding and cannot yet be seen through the longer lens of history. 
The simplest explanation for what happened to the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017 
is that Myanmar’s military remained unconstrained by new democratic insti-
tutions and continued to set its own objectives, pursuing them with familiar 
strategies of force and terror. What this article attempts to show is that in ad-
dition to this, at a deeper level, among a great majority of ordinary people, 
there was continuity of the distrust, suspicion, and the malaise that afflicts 
societies that have lived under terror and repression—a normality dominated 
by personal and communal suffering, overladen with grief, fear, anger and 
disregard for the rights of others and outsiders.61 
In her 1991 essay “Freedom from Fear,” Aung San Suu Kyi wrote that the 
“quintessential revolution is that of the spirit, born of an intellectual convic-
tion of the need for change in those mental attitudes and values which shape 
the course of a nation’s development.”62 By birthright and ambition, Aung 
San Suu Kyi should have championed the “revolution of the spirit” that her 
country needed. Suu Kyi possessed, in her own words, “a historical sense that 
despite all setbacks the condition of man is set on an ultimate course for both 
spiritual and material advancement.”63 Suu Kyi recognized that Burmese so-
ciety was wracked by distrust and uncertainty and that saddha (confidence in 
moral, spiritual and intellectual values)64 needed to be rebuilt, drawing on 
what she describes as “the Burmese capacity for the sustained mental strife 
and physical endurance necessary to withstand the forces of negativism, big-
otry, and hate.”65 The impetus for struggle, according to Suu Kyi, is a genuine 
respect for individual liberty, freedom, peace and justice.66 One of the trage-
dies of Myanmar is that Suu Kyi did not demonstrate this respect for the Roh-
ingya when she was put to the test. She remained part of a political culture 
where genocide of the country’s archetypal outsiders, the Rohingya, was pos-
sible. 
 
 
 
 61 ANNA BURNS, MILKMAN: A NOVEL 89 (2018). 
 62 FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at 183. 
 63 Id. at 184–85. 
 64 H. Saddhatissa, The Saddha Concept in Buddhism, 11 EASTERN BUDDHIST J. 137 
(1978). 
 65 Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma’s Quest for Democracy, in WORLD RELIGIONS AND 
DEMOCRACY 84 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2005). 
 66 Id. 
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II. TRANSITION WITHOUT JUSTICE 
A. Ethnic Conflict and Military Rule 
 
Myanmar’s transition toward a limited form of constitutional democracy, 
after two decades of direct military rule, began in 2008, with a successful ref-
erendum on the 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.67 
The Constitution preserves a key role for the military in the political life of 
the state.68 Twenty five percent of members of the parliament in both cham-
bers must be serving army officers appointed by the military commander-in-
chief.69 The commander-in-chief has a decisive say in the appointment of the 
President and two vice-presidents;70 certain key cabinet positions (such as 
 
 67 Timeline: Myanmar’s Slow Road to a New Constitution, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2008), https 
://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-elections-constitution/timeline-myanmars-slow-r 
oad-to-a-new-constitution-idUSBKK26169420080209. 
 68 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYAN., May 29, 2008, art. 6 (stating 
that the Union’s objectives are: “(a) non-disintegration of the Union; (b) non- disintegration 
of National solidarity; (c) perpetuation of sovereignty; (d) flourishing of a genuine, disci-
plined multi-party democratic system; (e) enhancing the eternal principles of Justice, Lib-
erty and Equality in the Union and; (f) enabling the Defence Services to be able to partici-
pate in the National political leadership role of the State”); see also Si Thu Aung, To 
Service as Balancing Weight, N. LIGHT OF MYAN. (Mar. 21, 2008), http://burmalibrary.o 
rg/docs4/NLM2008-03-21.pdf (Si Thu Aung argues that the presence of the military in 
parliament serves as a “balancing weight”, or a system of checks and balances, within the 
fledgling parliamentary democracy). 
 69 Under Chapter IV of the Constitution, in the states and divisions, as in the national 
legislature, twenty-five percent of seats are reserved for the Tatmadaw. Thus, Military rep-
resentatives occupy 110 seats in the 440-seat Pyithu Hluttaw, or lower house; fifty-six out 
of 224 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw or upper house, and more than 200 seats in the fourteen 
state and regional hluttaws. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYAN., May 
29, 2008, art. 13, 14, 109, 141. 
 70 The President is elected by a meeting of the Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw (both chambers of 
parliament) meeting in plenary session after three candidates have been nominated by the 
two chambers and the army members meeting separately. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF THE UNION OF MYAN., May, 29, 2008, art. 60. The Constitution provide exclusionary 
provisions relating to the position of President and Vice-President: the President must be 
at least forty-five years of age and born of parents who were both citizens, and must be 
acquainted with the political, administrative, economic, and military affairs of the state. Id. 
at art. 59. He or she must also have no allegiance to, citizenship of, or rights and privileges 
availed by a foreign power, nor can his or her parents, spouse, children, or their spouses. 
Id. In addition, like members of the Hluttaw, he or she has to have lived in Myanmar for 
the previous twenty years unless abroad with government permission, free from convic-
tions, of sound mind, not destitute, and not in receipt of support from foreign governments 
or religious organizations. Id. The Presidential term of office is five years and he or she 
may serve for only two terms. Id. at art. 61. The President can be impeached if charged by 
twenty-five percent of either house of the Hluttaw. Id. at art. 71. For his removal, a two-
thirds vote is required. Reasons for impeachment include: high treason; breach of the pro-
visions of the Constitution, misconduct; disqualification; inefficiency. Id. 
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Home Affairs, Border Affairs and Defence) are confined to active military 
personnel;71 and the army is fiscally and administratively autonomous.72 Dur-
ing states of emergency, which are declared by the President, the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers of the Union are transferred to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Defence Services.73 Article 445 of the 2008 Constitution pro-
vides immunity for members of the former military government in relation to 
any act done in the execution of duty;74 the Defence Service has the right to 
independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces.75 In 
the adjudication of military justice, the decision of the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Defence Services is final and conclusive.76 Amendment of key provi-
sions of the Constitution requires the support of more than 75 percent of mem-
bers of parliament, followed by approval in a referendum.77 This means that 
the support of the military is necessary in order to change the Constitution. 
In 2010, the military withdrew from power to make way for elections and 
a nominally civilian government. The leading democratic opposition party, 
the National League for Democracy (NLD), boycotted the elections because 
the party’s leader, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former political prisoner 
Aung San Suu Kyi, was not permitted to stand for election.78 The election was 
won by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). 
There was deep skepticism in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 elections 
about whether the military intended to allow genuine democratic reform. But, 
between 2010 and 2015, under President Thein Sein, the new government un-
dertook a program of liberalisation, releasing political prisoners, legalizing 
trade unions, allowing public political gatherings, easing press censorship, 
and permitting the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools.79 The 
government also accelerated efforts to end ongoing civil conflict with the 
 
 71 Id. at art. 232(a)(ii). 
 72 Id. at ch. VII. 
 73 Id. at art. 418(a). 
 74 Id. at art. 445. 
 75 Id. at art. 20(b). 
 76 Id. at art. 343. 
 77 Id. at art. 436(a). 
 78 Myanmar Bars Suu Kyi’s Election Participation, CNN (Mar. 10, 2010), https://www. 
cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/03/10/myanmar.election.law/index.html (reporting that 
electoral law prohibited Suu Kyi from standing for election because she had been convicted 
of offences); see also Randy James, John Yettaw: Suu Kyi’s Unwelcome Visitor, TIME 
(May 20, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1899769,00.html (re-
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 79 Catherine Renshaw, Human Rights Under the New Regime, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND LEGAL CHANGE IN MYANMAR 215–34 (Andrew Harding & Khin Khin Oo eds., 2017). 
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country’s many armed ethnic organizations, who had been struggling for in-
dependence or a greater degree of autonomy since the end of colonial rule.80 
An editorial in the The New Light of Myanmar contrasted the “violent con-
flicts, protests and bloodshed” that have marked other countries’ transitions 
to democracy, with Myanmar’s “rapid, peaceful transition with mutual under-
standing and trust and negotiations as directed by its former rulers.” The edi-
torial asked: “Can there be a more efficient, correct way? Hence, the Myanmar 
government can daringly disclose that there is no way to deviate from its dem-
ocratic transition. The President and other responsible leaders have reassured 
the international community that they will never turn back from the country’s 
changes and reforms.”81 
In 2010 Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest and in 2011 she 
declared that she trusted President Thein Sein to further democratization.82 
“The Lady”, as she is known within Myanmar, told foreign diplomats that she 
is “confident about the future and optimistic about the possibility of genuine 
change” and that “Thein Sein can be trusted, he is genuinely trying to reform 
the country, and needs international support.”83 The new government’s 
strongest claim to credibility—both internally and externally—was Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the government’s path of reform.84 In 2012, the 
NLD contested seats in federal by-elections and Aung San Suu Kyi herself 
 
 80 The government signed an official ceasefire with the Shan State Army-South (SSA-
South) at the end of 2011. Aung Naing Oo, “Give Peace in Burma a Chance”, IRRAWADDY 
(Dec. 13, 2011). On January 12, 2012, the government signed a ceasefire with the 19-
member Karen National Union, to end hostilities between the military and the Karen Na-
tional Liberation Army. Marte Nilsen, Will Democracy Bring Peace to Myanmar?, 16 
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Maung Than, Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar 
(Burma), in ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 65–108 (Kusuma Snitwongse & W. 
Scott Thompson eds., 2005). 
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tion leader and former political prisoner, said that: “What has happened in these last few 
months is a miracle for us . . . . To be frank, in the very beginning, I didn’t believe a word 
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was elected to parliament.85 In the general elections of 2015, the NLD swept 
to power. Barred from becoming President by a special provision in the Con-
stitution, Suu Kyi appointed herself Special Counsellor of State, a role which 
she said was “above the President.”86 
Myanmar’s transition is “liberation from above” or “regime-initiated lib-
eralisation.”87 It is the result of a decision on the part of the military to with-
draw from direct rule and affect an orderly transfer of power to a civilian gov-
ernment. From the military’s perspective, the success of transition depends on 
preserving the constitutional guarantees about military autonomy and a role 
for the military in the political life of the state, including a guarantee that there 
would be no prosecution of military officers for crimes committed while the 
military was in power. The military’s primary justification for a continuing 
political role was ongoing civil conflict and the potential for the disintegration 
of the Union.88 Praetorianism and the failure of representative democracy, 
which are the themes of Myanmar’s post-colonial history, both derive from 
the core problem of attaining national unity in the face of ethnic diversity.89 
Burmese leaders trace the origins of disunity to British rule (1825–1948) and 
to the British “divide and conquer” strategy, which (they claim) led to intrac-
table divisions between Myanmar’s majority Buddhist Bamar population, and 
ethnic minorities (the Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, and 
Mon peoples) who inhabit Myanmar’s outlier regions.90 Myanmar’s Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Khin Maung Win wrote in 2004: 
Myanmar is a Union composed of more than one hundred dif-
ferent national races, each with its own culture and traditions. 
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Politically, there cannot be lasting peace and stability in the 
country without national unity. Unfortunately, the divide and 
rule policy practiced by the British colonialists resulted in sus-
picion and discord among the national races. This subse-
quently led to armed insurgency that spread to various parts of 
the country for decades. The question of achieving national 
unity and bringing to an end the armed insurgency are vital 
issues for any government, past, present and future.91 
While there was a prospect that conflict could lead to the secession of some 
ethnic states, the military would preserve its political independence and power 
to ensure the country remained unified. During the decades of military rule, 
the imperative of maintaining unity justified extreme military tactics, includ-
ing the abuse of civilians. Military operations under General Ne Win, for ex-
ample, who ruled Burma from 1962–1988, were based on the “Four Cuts” 
strategy, Pya Ley Pya, designed to cut the main links (food, funds, intelli-
gence, recruits) between insurgents, their families and local villagers.92 The 
British had used a similar strategy to defeat the communist insurgency in Ma-
laysia after the Second World War and the United States used a similar strat-
egy in the Second Vietnam War. The terrorization of local civilian populations 
was an inherent part of the strategy: abuse of civilian’s human rights was es-
sential to its success. Operations designed to clear areas of insurgents were 
cordoned off; villagers were ordered to move to new military-controlled loca-
tions and villagers who remained were treated as insurgents and risked being 
shot on sight.93 The military then confiscated food and destroyed crops.94 
From 1992, successive United Nations Special Rapporteurs, the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and domestic and international non-
governmental organizations reported on war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity carried out in pursuit of Tatmadaw suppression of ethnic insurgen-
cies.95 
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The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, signed in 2015 by the government 
and representatives of some ethnic insurgent groups, did not include provi-
sions for the establishment of criminal proceedings in relation to crimes com-
mitted by the military (or crimes committed by ethnic armies); nor did it refer 
to the establishment of truth commissions; nor to reparations.96 It did, how-
ever, refer to the pursuit of social and economic goals: protecting the environ-
ment, improvements to health and education, and addressing the chronic drug 
problem that exists in many ethnic states.97 The view shared by many among 
the military, leaders of ethnic armies, and the NLD, was that focusing on ret-
ribution—or even calling for recognition of the crimes committed by the for-
mer military regime through the establishment of a truth commission—would 
destabilize the political situation and undermine prospects for democratic con-
solidation and peace.98 Renowned Myanmar scholar Dr. Tim Maung Maung 
Than said, “There are certain red lines in Myanmar for the military. Transi-
tional justice is one of the red lines.”99 
 
B. The Shadow of the 1990 Elections 
 
There was a clear historical precedent for what might happen if the demo-
cratic opposition crossed the red line. In general elections held in 1990, the 
NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a sweeping victory, securing more than 
50% of the popular vote. The military, however, refused to transfer power to 
the NLD. The reason for this—in popular legend at least—was an offhand 
comment from U Kyi Maung, chairman of the NLD, who in a post-election 
press conference referred to “Nuremberg-style tribunals” while explaining to 
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a foreign journalist that the NLD did not intend to seek accountability for what 
the army had done to the people during its period of rule. “Here in Burma,” 
said Kyi Maung, “we do not need any Nuremberg-style tribunals.”100 Many 
people in Myanmar believe that one of the primary reasons why the Burmese 
military refused to relinquish power after the 1990 elections was because the 
generals feared they would be tried for crimes committed during the period of 
dictatorship.101 A quarter of a century after their first abortive attempt to take 
power, the NLD was determined to ensure that history would not repeat itself 
and that the generals would not once again be frightened into retreating from 
reform.102 Through public statements and gestures of support for the 
Tatmadaw, Aung San Suu Kyi continually reassured the military that the NLD 
would not seek retribution for acts committed during the years of military 
rule.103 When she discussed mechanisms for accountability, which was rarely 
and reluctantly, it was in the form of a truth and reconciliation commission, 
similar to the South African commission, which might be established at some 
distant point in the future.104 Suu Kyi said that she followed in the footsteps 
of leaders such as Desmond Tutu, who preached forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion rather than vengeance and retribution: “Whoever [committed wrongs], 
we will show them how forgiving we are. No one needs to be afraid of the 
NLD forming government. We have no plan to seek revenge.”105 After 2012, 
Suu Kyi pointedly embraced the Tatmadaw as “her father’s army” and de-
clared that she was “very fond” of the army.106 She asked the people to recon-
cile with the military and move forward hand-in-hand.107 
 
C. Setting the Junta Free 
 
Suu Kyi’s views on non-retribution were in line with those of her colleague 
and mentor U Tin Oo, who founded the NLD with Suu Kyi in 1988 and who 
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was at various points in time the party’s Vice President and President. Tin Oo 
said: 
Our policy from the beginning was to renounce violence or 
any armed struggle as an instrument of policy . . . if we are 
burning for some sort of revenge, we will achieve nothing. The 
people will only say that the NLD is the same as the military 
people. We have suffered great loss, but we do not seek any 
retribution. Victims should be compensated, but we seek no 
revenge . . . we never think about it. People must work harmo-
niously, all together, whatever their past . . . I feel happy, as 
long as I can see the liberty of my country again. We want 
peace and harmony restored for our people.108 
Tin Oo served for a time as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and 
as Defence Minister while Burma was under the rule of General Ne Win.109 
Tin Oo used the Four Cuts strategy to wipe out ethnic militias in Rakhine state 
and, in the process, destroying Rohingya villages and driving villagers across 
the border to then East Pakistan.110 From one perspective, therefore, the 
NLD’s approach to retributive justice was a pragmatic one. Attempts to un-
cover and explain the past would not only have destabilized the political situ-
ation, they would have led to uncomfortable questions for some members of 
the National League for Democracy. In her famous 1988 speech at Shweda-
gon Pagoda, given in the wake of the student uprising and its violent suppres-
sion by the Tatmadaw, Suu Kyi asked the people to “try to forget what has 
already taken place” and “not to lose their affection for the army.”111 
 
 108 RICHARD COCKETT, BLOOD, DREAMS AND GOLD: THE CHANGING FACE OF BURMA 
188–89 (2015). 
 109 Tin Oo was Defence Minister between 1974 and 1976. See Biography of CRPP Mem-
bers, BURMA LIBR. (May 17, 1999), http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199 
905/msg00281.html. 
 110 See Rohingya Condemn Recent U Tin Oo’s Statement, KALADAN NEWS (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://kaladanpress.org/v3/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=338 
9:rohingya-condemn-recent-u-tin-oos-statement-&catid=141:october-2011&Itemid=2; 
Penny Green et al., Genocide Received, Genocide Continues: Myanmar’s Annihilation of 
the Rohingya, INT’L STATE CRIME INITIATIVE (Apr. 11, 2018), http://statecrime.org/data/20 
18/04/ISCI-Rohingya-Report-II-PUBLISHED-VERSION-revised-compressed.pdf; An-
drew Selth, Myanmar’s Armed Forces and the Rohingya Crisis, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Aug. 
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In 1991, Samuel Huntington set out the considerations, which new demo-
cratic regimes must take into account in deciding how to address crimes com-
mitted by officials of the predecessor regime.112 In Huntington’s view, the 
decision to prosecute and punish, or forgive and forget, did not turn on moral 
or legal arguments about societal obligations to truth, justice and the rule of 
law. Instead, the decision was determined by the nature of the democratisation 
process and the distribution of political power during and after transition. 
Huntington argued that in circumstances where democratic transformations 
were initiated and guided by leaders of the existing authoritarian regime, as-
surances regarding non-prosecution—amnesties—were essential to prospects 
of democratic consolidation. Put simply, no authoritarian leader would enable 
transition if they anticipated being prosecuted as a result. Amnesty was the 
price of peaceful transformation. Some academics expressed support for 
avoiding the issue of accountability during Myanmar’s transition. “Set the 
Junta Free,” wrote Ian Holliday and Roman David113 
III. TIME, SUFFERING, AND MEMORY 
A. Buddhism and Transitional Justice 
 
Implicit in the argument for deferring justice was the understanding that 
the preservation and consolidation of democracy required peace and stability. 
Development, to improve the health, education, and living standards of the 
people, also required peace. Therefore, ran the argument, those who were gen-
uinely interested in protecting human rights must support peace and political 
stability at all costs. If justice (in the sense of accountability for past acts of 
the military) stood in the way of peace, then justice should be deferred or sac-
rificed.114 The forward-looking constitutional project of democratic consoli-
dation was pitted against the backward-looking project of retributive justice. 
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Official discourse in the early years of transition sought to emphasise unity 
and political progress rather than division and historical grievances. Strength-
ening institutions was the focus of transition, not punishing individuals.115 
Yet, to cast the problem of transitional justice in Myanmar as “peace versus 
justice,” the well-known devil’s choice of transitioning countries, would be to 
view the issue through too narrow a lens. Suu Kyi’s emphasis on forgiving 
and forgetting was consonant with deeply held and widely understood Bud-
dhist understandings about the nature of suffering, time and punishment.116 
Like many people in Myanmar, Suu Kyi had suffered grave injustice at the 
hands of the military. She spent eighteen years under house arrest, was sepa-
rated from her children, and endured slander and humiliation. Her husband 
died alone in England because the military would not guarantee Suu Kyi’s 
entry back into Burma if she left the country to be with him. But for Suu Kyi, 
the law of karma was a more appropriate response to suffering than retribu-
tion. In The Voice of Hope, she said that Myanmar’s military dictators might 
be able to avoid the repercussions of breaking human laws, but that: 
They are not above the law of karma, because the law of karma 
is actually very scientific. There is always a connection be-
tween cause and effect. It’s like the light of a star isn’t it? The 
light that we see now was initiated so many light years ago, 
but there it is. In science too there can be a seemingly long gap 
between cause and effect. But there’s always the connection 
between them.117 
The Buddhist understanding of time is at odds with the linear conception 
of time in Western thought. Western thinking is preoccupied with the future 
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(a better age that lies ahead) and the past (which provides lessons for the fu-
ture). The present, however, is devalued in Western thought: “We do not rest 
satisfied with the present . . . [f]or the present is generally painful to us.”118 
The Buddhist experience of the present is entirely different.119 In Buddhist 
philosophy, the past and future do not exist. Nor does the present, in the sense 
that Westerners commonly understand it as something distinguished from the 
past and future. The Buddhist conception of temporality is a challenge to re-
tributive justice because it sits uneasily with a focus on the past (establishing 
guilt) and the future (promoting deterrence). 
In Buddhist thought, all that exists is eternity, without an individual fixed 
self, an “I”, at the core of it.120 One of the central goals of Buddhism is to 
realize that the ego or the self—understood as a stable, localizable, and auton-
omous instance of control, which governs our decisions—is illusory. The 
Buddhist conception of the self presents another challenge to core tenets of 
transitional justice because it stands at odds with the individualistic focus of 
much Western legal theory about transitional justice (individuals as perpetra-
tors and victims).121 In terms of victims, the claim that transitional justice pro-
cesses promote healing for individual victims122 is, from a Buddhist perspec-
tive, based on a profoundly simplistic view of how psychotherapy works. 
Catharsis may have short-term benefits for some, but healing is a long-term, 
culturally determined process that involves more than emotional abreaction. 
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B. Truth 
 
While Buddhism does not countenance retribution, there is a role for 
truth.123 In Suu Kyi’s view, “truth and reconciliation go together. Once the 
truth has been admitted, forgiveness is far more possible. Denying the truth 
will not bring about forgiveness, neither will it dissipate the anger in those 
who have suffered.”124 Suu Kyi said that suffering had to be acknowledged: 
You can’t just wipe away the past. If you try, there will always 
be this ocean of festering resentment within those who have 
truly suffered. They will feel that their sufferings have been 
pushed aside, as though they’ve suffered for nothing; as 
though they’ve undergone torture for nothing; as though their 
sons and fathers had died for nothing.125 
A decade before transition began, Suu Kyi was asked specifically about a 
Truth and Reconciliation Council in Burma. She said: 
I think in every country which has undergone the kind of trau-
matic experience that we have had in Burma, there will be a 
need for truth and reconciliation. I don’t think that people will 
really thirst for vengeance once they have been given access 
to the truth. But the fact that they are denied access to the truth 
simply stokes the anger and hatred in them. That their suffer-
ings have not been acknowledged makes people angry. That is 
one of the great differences between SLORC and ourselves. 
We do not think that there is anything wrong with saying we 
made a mistake and that we are sorry.126 
Yet once transition was underway, Suu Kyi’s language and actions be-
trayed profound unease at the prospect of any sustained process of truth-tell-
ing—of remembering, mourning, or acknowledging the traumas of the past. 
The precarious political balance of power, the complex history implicating 
current heroes of democracy, the profoundly Buddhist conceptions of time, 
suffering and being, which affected ordinary understandings of appropriate 
forms of acknowledgement and redress, augured against the pursuit of truth—
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telling processes. Ultimately, Suu Kyi did not make it a condition of her co-
operation in the transition that Myanmar’s military rulers acknowledge or 
apologize for the years of terror endured by the people. The attitude of many 
people in the country was that if Suu Kyi, “Mother Suu,” was content to wait 
for acknowledgement of the past, then they too should be content to wait. 
 
C. Burmese Exceptionalism 
 
In relation to long-standing external critics of military rule in Myanmar, 
including political leaders in the United States and Great Britain, Suu Kyi re-
minded them that they could never be as familiar as she was with the particu-
larities of Myanmar’s transition and that it was for the people of Myanmar to 
decide what to do about the past.127 This argument was largely accepted by 
leaders in the USA, Great Britain and Canada. Suu Kyi’s position was not, 
after all, unusual for the leader of a country transitioning from oppression and 
civil war. Historically, most countries undergoing transition opt for a combi-
nation of “amnesia and amnesty” as the response to a painful past wrought by 
violent internal conflict.128 In 1975, Spain made its transition to democracy 
with a conscious policy of forgetting;129 twenty years later, the Irish peace 
process gave token recognition to the significance of memory and history, 
whilst placing greater emphasis on the desirability of “a new beginning”: 
The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly re-
grettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who 
have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best 
honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate 
ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and 
mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the hu-
man rights of all.130 
Suu Kyi joined the military in constructing a political process of forgetting 
rather than remembering.131 Suu Kyi’s aim was to build reconciliation, toler-
ance, and mutual trust by means other than grappling with the trauma of a 
complex past. The alternative means for achieving important transitional 
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goals was to be an intense focus on the rule of law as the new lodestar for 
relations between the military, the government, and the people. 
 
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
A. The Rule of Law in Myanmar 
 
The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are ac-
countable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and inde-
pendently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards.132 The rule of law requires fairness in the appli-
cation of the law, the separation of powers, popular participation in decision-
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal 
transparency.133 The rule of law is valued because it positively affects an in-
dividual’s ability to live and function in society without fear and with greater 
freedom, dignity, and confidence.134 For Aung San Suu Kyi, during the long 
years of dictatorship, the rule of law stood in opposition to the arbitrary exer-
cise of state power by the military. Suu Kyi understood the rule of law to mean 
the impartial enforcement of just laws, which were enacted with the authority 
of a democratically elected legislature and interpreted by an independent ju-
diciary.135 She distinguished the rule of law from law and order: “[t]here is no 
intrinsic virtue to law and order unless ‘law’ is equated with justice and ‘order’ 
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with the discipline of the people satisfied that justice has been done.”136 She 
noted that “law as an instrument of state oppression is a familiar feature of 
totalitarianism.”137 In speeches and statements she drew on Buddhist concepts 
of dhamma—righteousness or virtue—to explain the meaning of the rule of 
law.138 Her writing conveys her sensitivity to the debilitating consequences of 
being forced to live in continual fear of the arbitrary exercise of power.139 In 
Suu Kyi’s view, one of the many damaging effects of fear was that it de-
formed—“warped”—reason and conscience.140 
At the beginning of Myanmar’s democratic transition, the rule of law was 
in a state of grave disrepair. In the period from 1962 to 2010, governance in 
Burma/Myanmar was characterized by the arbitrary exercise of power, the 
extra-judicial and systematic use of violence to suppress dissent, and wide-
spread corruption.141 Part of the military’s strategy of control involved the ex-
ercise of random acts of oppression and deliberate violence against the civilian 
population in ethnic states and regions.142 It was common for Tatmadaw sol-
diers to round up men, women and children in entire villages.143 Some of the 
men would then be randomly selected, accused (without evidence) of being 
collaborators with ethnic insurgents, tortured and killed.144 The purpose was 
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to dissuade others from collaborating.145 Political opponents of the regime 
were commonly arrested, imprisoned and subjected to torture.146 The general 
population of Myanmar lived in a continual state of fear. 
In democratizing societies, transitional justice measures are held to facili-
tate adherence to the rule of law by establishing that the law does not exempt 
those who wield power (demonstrating the generality of law) and by demon-
strating the ways in which legal systems failed to protect the rights of citizens 
in the past (providing the basis for future reform).147 Transitional justice pro-
cesses also often involve vetting and dismissing those who abused their posi-
tions, increasing the integrity of rule of law systems.148 The problem for Suu 
Kyi and for other transitional leaders was how to signal transformative politics 
to a traumatised population in the absence of criminal trials or truth commis-
sions demonstrating the end of arbitrary rule and a commitment to principles 
of justice. 
 
B. The Rule of Law During Transition 
 
The rule of law emerged as the standard-bearer for justice in the transition-
ing regime. After 2012, both the military and Suu Kyi extolled the rule of law 
as a panacea for the ongoing abuses of power that accompanied military action 
in ethnic conflict zones, and as a remedy for the mistrust that existed between 
the military and the people. Instead of grand gestures of justice for historical 
wrongs, such as trials or truth commissions, the new order set about building 
trust through everyday demonstrations that the military was no longer unac-
countable and that public officials were subservient to the law. The new re-
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gime created institutions designed to monitor government behaviour, includ-
ing a National Human Rights Commission and a Lower House Committee for 
the Rule of Law, Peace and Tranquillity,149 and permitted the prosecution of 
several low-ranking members of the military.150 In 2016, for example, seven 
Burmese soldiers were brought before a military court, charged with the mur-
der of ethnic villagers in Myanmar’s Northern Shan state, and convicted and 
sentenced to five years in jail with hard labor.151 Announcing the prosecution, 
the Chief of Military Intelligence said that members of the armed forces who 
violated military laws and procedures would be prosecuted according to the 
rule of law.152 
The protest at the Letpadaung copper mine was an early test case for the 
rule of law’s potential to bring justice, end impunity, and establish trust be-
tween the government and the people. The case concerned land-grabbing, a 
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common complaint during the years of military rule.153 In 2010, a company 
owned by the military confiscated a large parcel of farmland in the Sagaing 
region to develop a copper mine in partnership with a Chinese industrial and 
arms manufacturer. Local farmers and Buddhist monks began a peaceful pro-
test on the disputed land, demanding the return of the land and an end to en-
vironmentally disastrous copper mining. In the early morning of November 
29, 2012, as protesters and their families slept, security forces entered the 
campsite and dispersed the protest using teargas, smoke bombs, and fire.154 In 
the wake of the incident, President Thein Sein formed a Parliamentary Com-
mission, chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi, to establish the facts and inquire 
whether mining should continue. In March 2013, the Commission handed 
down its report.155 The report did not recommend the closure of the copper 
mine, nor did it expose the perpetrators of the violence carried out on Novem-
ber 29. Instead, it advised protesters to desist and the company to maintain the 
environment and provide jobs and education to the local community. In a 
meeting with farmers, Suu Kyi said that Myanmar could not afford to shut 
down the mine and risk turning away foreign investors, and that in any regard 
their protest was illegal: “[Y]ou all have to ask permission from the govern-
ment if you protest as our country has the rule of law now. Those who do not 
respect the rule of law, they could get punished.”156 
Distorted understandings of the rule of law were repeated in the years that 
followed. From 2012 the rule of law was regularly invoked by the military, 
by Aung San Suu Kyi, by the Office of State Counsellor, and by the Presi-
dent’s office, to shut down criticism of the government and the military.157 
Colonial era laws such as the Official Secrecy Act and the Unlawful Assembly 
Act were used numerous times against citizens and members of community-
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based organizations.158 In 2014, a team of journalists reported that chemical 
weapons were being produced in a secretive army installation in Pakokku 
Township.159 The three reporters, the journal’s editor, and its chief executive 
officer were charged under the Official Secrets Act and sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment with hard labor.160 In January 2015, two Kachin school-teach-
ers, Maran Lu Ra and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin, were raped and murdered 
in a small village in Shan state.161 The suspected perpetrators were members 
of the military’s Light Infantry Battalion 503,162 which had been stationed in 
the village at the time of the crimes. Shortly after the discovery of the bodies, 
the military published a statement denying military involvement and stating 
that the Tatmadaw would take action based on the rule of law against anyone 
who alleged soldiers were involved in the crimes.163 The President’s Office 
supported the Tatmadaw’s position, claiming that an accusation against an 
individual solider was an accusation against the Tatmadaw as an institution, 
and warning that the Tatmadaw had a right to defend itself by prosecuting 
those who make unfounded accusations.164 The government passed press-re-
lated laws, such as the Telecommunications Law, introduced in 2013, which 
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were used by both the Military and the NLD to stifle criticism of the govern-
ment on social media.165 The Telecommunications Law was used to prosecute 
twenty-five year-old Chaw Sandi Tun, who posted a comment on Facebook 
likening the colour of Aung San Suu Kyi’s dress to the colour of the military’s 
uniforms.166 Tun was charged with defamation under Article 34(d) of the Act, 
which carries a penalty of up to five years in prison.167 
A deformed understanding of the rule of law was particularly patent in the 
events surrounding the massacre at Inn Dinn. In February 2018, Reuters pub-
lished a story about a grave containing the bodies of ten Rohingya men, found 
in a village in north-western Rakhine state.168 The men had been hacked to 
death or shot.169 Witnesses told reporters that soldiers plucked these ten men 
at random from among hundreds of men, women, and children who were seek-
ing safety from fighting on a nearby beach.170 In April 2018, seven Tatmadaw 
soldiers were convicted of the murders of the men and sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment with hard labour. But the two Reuters journalists who investi-
gated the murders were also arrested, charged, and found guilty of breaching 
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the Official Secrets Act 171 for possessing documents which had been provided 
to them by a policeman acting under orders to entrap the journalists.172 The 
police officer who revealed the set-up to the court was also detained on 
charges of violating the Official Secrets Act and the Police Disciplinary 
Act.173 He was sentenced to a year in prison.174 British Ambassador Dan 
Chugg, speaking on behalf of EU members, said the verdicts of the journalists 
had “dealt a hammer blow for the rule of law.”175 
The everyday application of the rule of law could not sustain transfor-
mation from authoritarian rule to democracy. Its foundation, shape, and im-
plementation was fundamentally “warped” by a cast of minds formed by dec-
ades of oppressive rule, by the absence of any public symbol of disjuncture 
with the past, and by a constitution—a founding legal document—which was 
unjust, which did not reflect the will of the people, and which was used as a 
vehicle for ongoing abuse and impunity. Suu Kyi herself subverted the Con-
stitution by avoiding Article 59(f), which prevents her from becoming Presi-
dent, by engineering her appointment as the Special Counsellor of State, a role 
which she said was “above the president.”176 Suu Kyi’s legal advisor, U Ko 
Ni, explained the reason why this extra-constitutional role was legitimate: 
We cannot talk about the rule of law. Matters relating to rule 
of law must be initially enacted fairly and justly by the parlia-
ment. Then, all people need to start obeying those laws. The 
present constitution is not fair to the people, and so, it has noth-
ing to do with the rule of law.177 
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U Ko Ni was assassinated at Yangon airport on January 29, 2017. The 
headline in the Myanmar Times read “The Death of the Rule of Law.”178 
During the first decade of transition, the rule of law was extolled but its 
effects in developing a society where people lived without fear and with 
greater freedom, dignity, and confidence were difficult to discern. The decade 
was marked by a preoccupation with the rule of law, with deep confusion 
about its meaning and application, and ongoing mistrust of the government’s 
conception of the rule of law. For most people in Myanmar, including the 
country’s leaders, the rule of law was still what those who held power exer-
cised in relation to others who had none. Like concepts such as truth and jus-
tice, the rule of law was distorted by the occlusions of history and by the fail-
ure to speak the truth about past oppression. These are the circumstances in 
which the tensions of transition and shifting possibilities of power give rise to 
new acts of barbarism; where the oppressed become the oppressors; where 
there is heightened fear and lawlessness; and where ancient grudges break to 
new mutiny. 
V. THE ROHINGYA IN MYANMAR: BEYOND THE LAW 
A. The Rohingya as Outsiders 
 
The early years of transition were marked by deep uncertainty. The old 
order was changing. Aung San Suu Kyi, for decades a staunch opponent of 
military rule and an icon of democracy, now shared power with the military 
and occupied a position that was “above the President.” Increasing freedom 
of speech included increasing levels of racially motivated hate speech. Com-
mitments to ending civil war were matched by increasing levels of conflict in 
ethnic states. The military acted with a heightened sense of danger from mul-
tiple fronts: instability due to new ethnic insurgencies; the potential of losing 
power to new political actors; the threat of losing economic wealth to new 
mechanisms of oversight. Other actors had new space in which to operate and 
new motivation for seeking power. Political actors who had suffered during 
the dictatorship, such as the Generation 88 leaders who fought in the 1988 
uprising, looked for opportunities to claim their political due; democratic lead-
ers who held power, such as the National League for Democracy and Aung 
San Suu Kyi, labored under the weight of expectations. The large diaspora 
returned home to find that there was not always room for them in the new 
regime. In much of Myanmar, the rule of law failed to constrain the actions of 
new and old actors. And there were some areas of the country beyond the 
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scope of law, vulnerable to extreme political action and reaction. In these ar-
eas, the strategy of ruling a line under history, forgiving and forgetting, mov-
ing forward, leaving truth for later, and gradually strengthening the rule of 
law, came radically undone. The attempted destruction of the country’s arche-
typal outsider, the Rohingya, was the final result of this. 
The Rohingya—identified by their dark skin, Chittagonian dialect, and Is-
lamic faith practices—maintained a precarious existence in Rakhine state, in 
north-west Myanmar, for at least 200 years. The Rohingya live mainly in the 
north of Rakhine, a religious and ethnic minority among the predominantly 
Buddhist population. The history of their presence there is deeply contested. 
The Rohingya claim their ancestors lived in Rakhine many centuries before 
British colonization. 179 Rakhine Buddhists (and many others in Buddhist ma-
jority Myanmar) claim that the British brought the Rohingya to Rakhine from 
India during the period of colonial rule.180 Among the Burman majority who 
have held power in Myanmar since the end of the Second World War, and 
among Rakhine Buddhists, the belief that the Rohingya do not belong in My-
anmar and should not be permitted to remain is widely held.181 
The question of who belongs in Rakhine and who does not is acute because 
of widespread landlessness, and lack of food, healthcare, and basic resources. 
Rakhine’s poverty rate is almost double the national rate;182 child mortality is 
among the highest in the country;183 immunization coverage is among the low-
est;184 adult illiteracy is 50 percent higher than the national average;185 one 
third of Rakhine children are underweight, and thirty-eight percent are 
stunted. In the North of Rakhine, where the majority of Rohingya live, there 
have been multiple outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases.186 When they 
can, the people of Rakhine subsist on agriculture and fishing.187 But with a 
long coastline along the Bay of Bengal, Rakhine is susceptible to cyclones, 
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natural disasters, and the effects of climate change. Former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, who was commissioned by the government of Myanmar 
to write a report on the problems of Rakhine in the wake of deadly conflict 
between Rohingyas and ethnic Rakhine in 2012, identified lack of develop-
ment and poverty as a major contributing factor to inter-ethnic tension.188 
Rakhine is home to other minorities, such as Hindus and Muslims Kamans, 
but ethnic Rakhine Buddhists predominate.189 Ethnic Rakhine have long de-
manded a fairer federal union from the centralist Burman government and the 
Arakan Army has pursued this demand with continuous insurgency.190 Ongo-
ing conflict exacerbates poverty and discourages investment, leading to fur-
ther conflict over scarcity. 
The foundational calamity for the Rohingya was British colonial rule. The 
Rohingya fought with the British in the Second World War in return for a 
promise that when the war ended, the British would create a Muslim National 
Area in Northern Arakan.191 The majority of the region’s Buddhists followed 
General Aung San and his “thirty comrades” in the Burma Independence 
Army (BIA), which fought with the Japanese.192 The Japanese victory over 
the British in Burma in 1942 had brutal consequences for the Muslims of Ara-
kan. They were denounced by the BIA as British collaborators and traitors, 
and the BIA sought to drive them from the country.193 British victory, the end 
of the Second World War, and Burmese independence did not restore land or 
property to the returning Muslims of Arakan.194 The Rohingya petitioned un-
successfully for the creation of an Islamic state and for integration of areas of 
Northern Arakan into what was then East Pakistan.195 Until 1961, there was 
conflict between Rakhine nationalists, who were pressing for the creation of 
their own state within Burma; Muslims, who were also pressing for their own 
independent state; and the army of Burma’s first independent government, 
which was committed to national unity. Between 1958 and 1961, a series of 
ceasefire agreements were signed between the central government and both 
the Rakhine nationalists and the Rakhine Muslims.196 The final ceasefire 
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agreement between the central government and the Muslim guerrillas in 
Northern Arakan recognized the “Rohingya” as a separate ethnic group.197 
This brief period of peace came to an end with the coup d’état of General 
Ne Win in 1962.198 As leader of the Burma Socialist Programme Party 
(BSPP), Ne Win presided over the drafting of the 1974 Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma,199 which provided for a one‐party 
system of government with nominally autonomous states for the non‐Burman 
nationalities, including the Rakhine.200 The Rohingya were not recognized. 
Ne Win militarized the state under a nationalist ideology of “one blood, one 
voice, one command.”201 Ne Win’s regime perpetrated forced relocations of 
Muslims, forced labor and severe human rights abuses.202 Again, hundreds of 
thousands of Muslims fled the country and some who remained created new 
armed resistances, such as the Rohingya Patriotic Front.203 During the next 
twenty-six years, while Ne Win pursued a Burmese form of socialism under 
one-party military rule, the military attempted to transform Myanmar by purg-
ing all forms of pluralism, ensuring the primacy of the Tatmadaw as the only 
potent political force responsible for the affairs of the state.204 Buddhism be-
came the military’s lodestar. The military was cleansed of Christian, Jewish, 
Muslim, and Hindu officers who refused to convert to Buddhism and the 
Tatmadaw was dispatched to suppress by brutal means, ethnic armies in 
Christian minority states such as Kachin and Shan.205 A new “purist” Buddhist 
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vision prevailed.206 In relation to the Rohingya, the overarching strategy of 
the military was to degrade life to the point where it could no longer be en-
dured: to deny food, work, the ability to marry within the law, and register the 
birth of their children.207 The aim was to force the Rohingya into ghettos to 
die of disease and hunger, or to force them to leave the country and flee into 
Bangladesh, or into Thailand and Malaysia via the desperate passage across 
the Andaman Sea, or through the jungle at the hands of people smugglers.208 
The military’s strategy included intermittent operations so brutal and ter-
rorizing that the Rohingya historically fled.209 In 1978, the military com-
menced military operation Ye The Ha, designed to flush out insurgents and 
their sympathizers.210 Simultaneously, they carried out a census operation, 
Naga Min, to check identity papers.211 In Muslim villages, these operations 
were accompanied by rape, murder, the destruction of mosques and the con-
fiscation of identity papers.212 200,000 Rohingya fled across the border to 
Bangladesh while state media propaganda blamed the trouble on Muslim ex-
tremists.213 In 1982 the Ne Win government passed the Citizenship Law, 
which restricted full citizenship to “national” ethnic groups such as Burmans, 
Mons or Rakhines.214 The Rohingya were not listed among the ethnic groups 
who were considered to belong in Burma.215 In 1991–92, following the Bur-
mese army’s suppression of the democracy uprising in 1988, the military’s 
attitude towards Muslims in Rakhine hardened.216 More army and local border 
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police, known as “Na Ka Sa,” were deployed in the Northern border region.217 
There were forced relocations and confiscation of Muslim land and property 
and accompanying brutality, including murder, rape and forced labor.218 
Large numbers of Rohingya died during this period and 250,000 Muslims 
from Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung fled into the Cox’s Bazar area 
of Bangladesh.219 
 
B. Citizenship and the 2008 Constitution 
 
The 2008 Constitution was specifically drafted to exclude the Rohingya 
by reserving important rights for citizens only.220 The constitutional prohibi-
tion on discrimination on the basis of race, birth, religion and other character-
istics, the right to freedom of religion, the right to freedom of expression and 
assembly, the right to freedom of movement, the right to education and the 
right to enterprise, are all explicitly reserved only for citizens.221 Policies, laws 
and regulations that deliberately target the Rohingya, such as the regulation in 
Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships that restricts Muslim families to hav-
ing only two children, are not unconstitutional.222 In 2015, the national parlia-
ment passed the “Four Race and Religion Protection Laws,”223 which gives 
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local authorities the power to monitor and control the marriage, reproductive 
and religious practices of target minority groups.224 Given the past practice of 
authorities in Rakhine state, which was to apply laws and regulations in ways 
that severely discriminated against the Rohingya,225 there were well-founded 
fears that the Four Laws presaged an intensification of efforts to marginalize 
and debase the Rohingya.226 In 2014, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Myanmar argued that:  
Given the gross and systematic nature of human rights viola-
tions in Myanmar over a period of many years, and the lack of 
accountability, there is an indication that those human rights 
violations are the result of a state policy that involves authori-
ties in the executive, military, and judiciary at all levels.227 
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C. The Path to Genocide 
 
In June 2012, President Thein Sein announced a state of emergency in 
Rakhine state and brought the area under military control.228 This followed 
widespread rioting after a group of Buddhist villagers detained a bus and 
killed ten Muslim passengers as reprisal for the alleged rape of a Buddhist 
woman.229 Military intervention fueled rather than diminished the violence, 
with reports that police and paramilitary forces opened fire on Muslims as 
Buddhist villagers burnt their homes.230 140,000 people were left homeless, 
and the army forcibly relocated many more Rohingya into overcrowded 
camps, restricting their movement, access to medical care, work, and food.231 
President Thein Sein’s public statement was that the “only solution” lay in the 
expulsion of the Rohingya to other countries or to camps overseen by 
UNHCR.232 In the wake of the violence, Aung San Suu Kyi appointed former 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to establish an advisory commission made 
up of domestic and international members, charged with developing recom-
mendation to improve conditions for all in Rakhine State.233 
In October 2016, the government of Myanmar announced that the military 
was commencing what it called a “clearance operation” in response to an at-
tack by armed insurgents on three border guard posts.234 The area was sealed 
off, movement within the area was restricted, and humanitarian agencies were 
denied access.235 The operation lasted from October 9, 2016 until February 9, 
2017.236 During that period, according to a report published by the United 
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Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, government forces 
carried out a series of atrocities against local Muslim populations.237 These 
included: the burning and looting of Rohingya villages; the murder of Roh-
ingya men, women, and children; summary execution of imams, religious 
scholars and community leaders; and rape and torture.238 The military used 
helicopters to fire bullets and drop grenades on villagers, and shot people as 
they were working on their farms, shopping in markets, or fishing.239 Hun-
dreds of thousands of villagers fled across the border to Bangladesh. In an 
open letter to the President of the Security Council, a group of Nobel Peace 
laureates said that “human tragedy amounting to ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity is unfolding in Myanmar.”240 One Rohingya said, “[n]ow is 
the worst it has ever been . . . . We have heard from our grandparents that there 
were bad things happening in the past too, but never like this.”241 In 2016, the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights presented a report to the Human Rights 
Council which suggested there had been a widespread or systematic attack 
against the Rohingya, which if established by a court of law would indicate 
the possible commission of crimes against humanity.242 
This report was followed, in February 2017, by another report by the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights into the government’s clearance operation 
in Northern Rakhine state after October 9, 2016.243 This report was carried out 
with a rigor and thoroughness designed to counter accusations of fabrica-
tion.244 Investigators, who were denied access to Northern Rakhine State, 
gathered evidence from 220 refugees who had fled across the border in Bang-
ladesh.245 They adopted the methods and techniques of a criminal investiga-
tion. They gathered first- hand testimony from men, women, and children in 
eight different refugee camps, who had been fired upon by helicopters, driven 
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from their villages, raped, burnt, and beaten.246 Investigators photographed 
the bullet and knife wounds, burns, and injuries that the assaults had left.247 
The evidence from all the camps was qualitatively and quantitatively con-
sistent.248 The Report stated: 
The testimonies gathered by the team—the killing of babies, 
toddlers, children, women and elderly; opening fire at people 
fleeing; burning of entire villages; massive detention; massive 
and systematic rape and sexual violence; deliberate destruction 
of food and sources of food—speak volumes of the apparent 
disregard by Tatmadaw and BGP officers that operate in the 
lockdown zone for international human rights law, in particu-
lar the total disdain for the right to life of Rohingyas.249 
Suu Kyi responded: “The Myanmar government is responding to the issue 
of Rakhine state based on the principles of the rule of law.”250 
In the wake of this report, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, together with human 
rights advocates, urged the Human Rights Council to establish a Commission 
of Inquiry (COI) to investigate allegations of violations, identify the perpetra-
tors and determine whether international crimes had taken place.251 Within the 
Human Rights Council, however, there was only sufficient support for estab-
lishing a Fact-Finding Mission.252 On 24 March 2017, a UN Fact-Finding 
Mission was created with a mandate to investigate reports “with a view to 
ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims.”253 Five 
months later, the military launched a second and more ferocious reprisal in 
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Rakhine state.254 The Mission provided its Final Report to the Human Rights 
Council in September 2018. The Report called for the investigation and pros-
ecution of Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung 
Hlaing, and his top military leaders for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.255 
Within Myanmar, vitriol against the Rohingya intensified and support for 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the military strengthened. In October 2016, the state-
run newspaper, the Global New Light of Myanmar, ran an editorial about the 
danger posed by terrorists. The writer used the analogy of fleas: a flea by itself 
is harmless, but together, they could amass enough force to cause chaos and 
destruction. In a similar way, argued the editorial, Muslim terrorists were try-
ing to disintegrate the unity and strength of the country by waging armed at-
tacks, spreading rumours and performing subversive activities. The editorial 
urged the people to be wary of the dangers of “detestable human fleas.”256 
Senior Burmese diplomats were reported describing the Rohingya as “ugly as 
ogres” because of their “dark brown” complexions and other racial features.257 
A Burmese commander gave an interview to the BBC in which he denied the 
possibility that the Tatmadaw was raping ethnic Rohingya because Rohingya 
women were “too dirty” to rape.258 In October 2017, one of the country’s most 
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revered monks, Sitagu Sayadaw, addressed a gathering of military officers, 
where he told a parable implying that non-Buddhists were sub-human beings, 
so killing them was not a sin.259  
What happened to the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017 can be read as an ex-
tension and intensification of military conduct that had been practiced in 1948, 
1962, and 1992. What ended as genocide was the continuation of a historical 
pattern in which the military acted in a precarious political context to address 
“the Rohingya problem,” using extreme violence, supported by a powerful 
logic of nationalism and religious fervor. In January 2017, a YouTube video 
was released on Facebook showing Burmese policemen at work in Ko Tan 
Kauk village in Northern Rakhine State.260 The video, taken by a member of 
the police, shows fellow policemen carrying out a military operation in a Roh-
ingya village.261 The men and boys of the village are seated in rows on the 
ground, their hands behind their heads and their knees bent, while a group of 
policemen beat them with sticks and kick them in the back and in the face.262 
At the very beginning of the video a young boy, appearing to be no more than 
7 or 8 years old, is kicked in the back as he moves towards the lines of men, 
his hands raised above his head.263 There is no sense of crisis or urgency in 
the actions of the police: they carry out the beatings in a casual, matter-of-fact 
way. Some of the policemen are aware that they are being filmed: one lights 
a cigarette and stares straight into the camera.264 The complacency of the per-
petrators, the casual violence, and the air of routine brutality were striking.265 
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In 2019, the Mission reported to the Human Rights Council that it had reason-
able grounds to conclude that the State’s genocidal intent against the Roh-
ingya had strengthened and that “there is a serious risk that genocidal actions 
may occur or recur.”266 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CALL TO MEMORY 
 In recent years, scholars have interrogated the “memory assumption” axio-
matic in writing about transitional justice. They have argued that there is no 
rule that a violent past must be addressed in any process of transition; that a 
therapeutic understanding of memory is not applicable in all cultural contexts; 
that acknowledging and addressing past wrongs is not necessary and can in-
deed undercut prospects for democratic consolidation.267 Critics of transi-
tional justice have argued that there is limited potential for court processes in 
the aftermath of conflict and authoritarian rule to deter wrongdoing, enhance 
social cohesion, produce reliable historical records about the context of inter-
national crimes, or promote healing for victims.268 The backdrop to Myan-
mar’s transformation from military rule to a limited form of constitutional de-
mocracy in the period 2008–2018 was a complex, fragile politics of transition 
where there was deep cultural ambivalence about pursuing accountability for 
past wrongs.269 In the particular circumstances of Myanmar, there appeared to 
be strong reasons for deferring serious discussion about transitional justice. 
Nonetheless, the failure of Myanmar’s leaders to provide even the most 
basic recognition of historical wrongs as part of the transition to democracy 
contributed to the carrying out of acts of mass atrocity against the Rohingya. 
This is because “forgetting” significantly contributed to a political culture 
where the identity and humanity of individual victims was not recognised and 
where pre-existing patterns of oppressive rule were able to continue, unpunc-
tuated by new understandings about the nature of the rule of law. The direct 
consequence of this was the willingness of the military to carry out—and the 
preparedness of many people in the country to accept—the commission of 
acts that are in likelihood genocide. I have shown that there was a historical 
precedent for forgetting as a political strategy in the transition from colonial-
ism. It was a strategy made politically palatable (and plausible to the outside 
world) by the dynamics of the military-led transformation of power (Section 
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I). It was supported by deep cultural beliefs and understandings about the na-
ture of suffering, time, and identity, held by many in the majority Buddhist 
population (Section II). The attempt to signal a new order of accountability by 
focusing on the rule of law could not shift past patterns of oppression and 
abuse (Section III). The result of all this was that the generals of the Tatmadaw 
had the freedom to dispose of “the Rohingya problem” with a fierceness and 
urgency that included atrocity (Section IV). If I am correct and the decision to 
pursue a policy of forgetting contributed to the genocide of the Rohingya, then 
Myanmar stands as a compelling case for remembering. 
The aim of any process of remembering—whether through a trial or truth 
commission—is to prompt the kind of complex national deliberation that can 
build a foundation for values of toleration, moderation, and civil respect.270 
Transitional justice processes and institutions are inevitably, regardless of 
their shortcomings, sites for discussion about the moral and legal worth of 
individual human beings and reflections about fundamental social and politi-
cal values. They are discursive phenomena about moral principles and the hu-
manity of victims, perpetrators, bystanders, and political leaders: public thea-
tres where complex deliberations about culpability, responsibility, state 
violence, and retribution play out.271 Processes for remembering also require 
us to compile detailed knowledge about other lives and about the indignities, 
abuses, and atrocities that bring lives to an end. At the highest point this ena-
bles an act of imagination, an invitation to a question that is fundamental to 
building social cohesion in deeply divided societies: “How would I feel if this 
were done to me?” In The Warrior’s Honor, Michael Ignatieff asserts that in 
ethnic conflict our ability to perceive separate human beings is replaced by an 
insistence on seeing groups.272 It was not by chance that the generals of the 
Tatmadaw, in their battles with ethnic insurgents, deliberately deployed sol-
diers to regions within the country that were foreign to them: where they did 
not speak the language and could not understand the customs. The generals 
were correct in assuming that it would be easier for soldiers to carry out terri-
ble acts against people with whom they felt no familiarity. 
After the Second World War, the archdeacon of Rangoon, George Apple-
ton, argued against the prosecution of Aung San. He said: “In Burma people 
do not generally think in terms of justice and reason, but in terms of person-
alities and relationships.”273 In Appleton’s view there were “racial factors” 
involved in the murder of Rashid and he foreshadowed violent reprisals 
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against Muslim Indians if the prosecution went ahead.274 The trial of Aung 
San, the country’s heroic soldier and statesman, would certainly not have gen-
erated closure: its consequences may have been dramatic and bloody. But a 
trial would have painted the story of Aung San and his victim Abdul Rashid 
in all its complex moral hues and prompted a set of questions that would have 
reverberated through the pages of Myanmar’s troubled history: Do the exi-
gencies of war justify torture and atrocity? Should even the country’s heroes 
be held to account when they breach fundamental laws of humanity? What 
value should be placed on individual life? What does it mean to respect the 
dignity of a human being, whether they are Muslim, or Christian, or Buddhist? 
At the core of my argument in this Article is the centrality of discussion of 
controversial views about the moral autonomy of the individual in the face of 
everyday calculations of politics and pragmatism and the role legal processes 
can play in provoking this discussion. 
As I write this Conclusion, the International Criminal Court has confirmed 
it has jurisdiction to consider the situation in Rakhine state even though My-
anmar is not a party to the Statute of the International Criminal Court.275 This 
is because one of the crimes Myanmar is alleged to have committed is the 
crime against humanity of deportation, partially carried out in the territory of 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh is a party to the statute of the International Criminal 
Court. In a statement rejecting the decision, a spokesperson for the govern-
ment of Myanmar said that the ruling on jurisdiction was “the result of faulty 
procedure and is of dubious legal merit.”276 Without domestic participation or 
internal legitimacy, it seems unlikely that the circuitous ICC process to secur-
ing jurisdiction will encourage civil dissensus in Myanmar, promote reasoned 
debate about the events in Rakhine state, or further the internalization of 
norms relating to justice and reason. But, in the absence of other forums for 
acknowledging the victims of administrative massacre in Myanmar, the ICC 
processes may yet stand as a fragile point of remembering—of resistance to 
the conclusion that the individual victim is “alone . . . outside history . . . non-
existent.”277 
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